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January 29, 1968

8527

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

THE "PUEBLO" AFFAIR
Ml". MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I applaud the position of President Johnson,
who recognizes that there are no simple
ways out of the grave crisis which has
dC\ eloped in the wake of the Pueblo affair. By taking the matt.er to the United
Nations forthwith, the President has
done what he can do, at this point, to
set in motion m achinery for what is to
be hoped can be a satisfactory solution.
In the meantime, however, the substance of om national int.erest ought n ot
to be lost sight of in hot pursuit of its
shadow. The problem of safeguarding the
interests of this Nation, and in a very
real sense, the wor d's interests is to see
to it that the 83 Americans-which I now
learn is the accun.te number-are returned alive, I repeat, the word is "alive,"
and that there is tvoided, at the same
time, another bloodbath in the model of
Vietnam which, in Korea, could so
much more readily become world war

m.

Whatever it takes to bring about that
result in full-not half of it but all of
it-is to be welcomed. It may be helpful
to bear in mind in this connection that
the responses in t he Barbary Wars, a
century and a half away, are not necessarily the answers f or a time and place
when nuclear Wltl" s only seconds away.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have p1;nted in the RECORD at
t his point statements I made over the
weekend r elative to my perspective on
the Pueblo seizme; also, ectitorials from
the Christian Science Monitor. the Wall
Street Journal, and the Baltimore Sun,
having to do with that affail".
TI1ere being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD,
DEMOCRAT, OF MONTANA
PERSPECTIVE oN THE .. PUEBLo••

On Friday last, I made the following statement:
"I a.m glad that the matter of the U.S.S.
Pueblo seizure Is being taken up by the
U .N. Security Council. One war is not only
enough for the world; it Is too much. I am
glad that t:,!s organlzat!.on-represcntlng
the world-Is facing up to its respons!bll!ty
in th!s matter because it 1s a most immediate
and pressing danger.
"The last thing we need is another land
war in As!a. If we want t o save the lives of
the 83 we had bjltter move clrcumspectly-as
we are--with patience--as we are--because
th!s Is a time of testing. A rash action could
well seal their doom. I want to see these
men sa,·ed-not d estroyed."
Those who would advise r ash, Immediate
and prcclpltant action against North Korea
should remJnd themselves of what happened
during the Korean War. When American
forces, having won a great victory by the
Inchon Jandlng, then advanced across the
38th para.llel to the Yn.lu River, the <l!vid!ng
line between Nortb Korea and China, a figure
close to one m1111on Chinese entered North
K orea. The result was a <l!rect and bloody
con!rontMion, a new war wh!ch prolongc<l
the conflict and produced tens of thousands
of a<ld!tlonal American casualties.
In the end, the Korean War terminated
!n a stalemate at the 38th parallel. What ho.s
£>xlstf'd Rlnre has not been" peace settlement.

but an ..1neasy truce arrangement. I would
also po!at out that since that t!me North
Korea has entered Into mutual security
treaties with both Oh!na and the Soviet
Union. Therefore, any rash action would not
only, !n all likelihood, seal the doom of the
83 Americans or the USS Pueblo, !t c:>Uld
also br!ng about another bloody and prolonged Involvement !n Korea and, per' >a ps,
even a direct con!roatatlon between this
country on the one hand and Oh!na and
the Soviet Un!on on the other.
It !s well to remember the matter of geography wh!ch 1s not at the moment a factor
!n V!et Nam where North V!et Nam and
Laos l!e between China and ourselves and
where Russia !s thousands o! miles away to
the north where !t borders China. At North
Korea, Russia !s right there as Is Oh!na. If
we would save these 83 Americans-and that
Is the most urgent and Important consideration-we would do well to ponder these posslb111t!es and to continue to move, as the
President !s doing, w!th caution, coolness,
and restraint.
The situation !n V!et Nam !s difficult and
dangerous. The s!tuat!on developing in North
Korea !s da.ngerous and difficult and far
more del!cate.

wise aBIIumptlon that the more each grea o
nation knows about the observable military
disposition of the other the safer !t w!ll be.
For the United States to see any unusun.l
troop movements--or thelr absence--in Eastern Europe Is Important. Uncertainly breeds
fear. The Information now gathered by the
reconnaissance satellites may well be a factor for peace.
For the Soviets to know something of the
United States ca.pactty for instant retal!atlon
!n the event of a nuclear attack, and vice
versa, helps preserve the over-all peace. And
perhaps slm!lar Information about the dtsposlt!on of the North Korean forces--at a
t!me when assassins and saboteurs were Invading the South Korean ca.p!tal-would be
helpful to eva.luate the scn.lc or the crisis.
RELATIVE IMPUNITY

But all this information does not provide
the United States w!th the means o! InvadIng Wonsan and recapturing the Pueblo. Indeed, as Amer!ca.n publ!c opinion vividly reflects, the United States !s having trouble
enough coping w!th !ts m.!l!tary problems !n
VIetnam.
For this reason, !t would seem that most
Americans are not demanding the kind of
action wh!ch an American President would
have asserted freely in the good old days.
[From the Christian Science Monitor,
"Perd!car!s al!ve or Ra!sull dead" !s now an
Jan. 29, 1968 J
empty and unreal!stlc threat.
The age of the small nation Is here. And
C'PERDJCABIS ALIVE''
wh!le
th!s relative immunity from big-nation
(By Erwin D. Canham)
force has !ts embarrassments for the United
We are no longer in the era o! gunboat States now, this Is the kind of world !n which
d!ploma•y.
the Unlted States bel!eves. If great war has
The terms of power have changed. T!me become too dangerous, too suicidal, !or the
was wh"n a great nation IH<e the United human race, and U lesser wars have each
States could have sent a small force of their share of Insupportable risk, then the
marines !n to Wonsan Harbor and tld!ed up world has come Into a n~w period.
t he matter o! the Pueblo !n short order. But
There are c!rcumstsnces In which force
today, behind every exercise of power by Is used, as !n VIetnam and !n Korea 18 years
great nations l!ke the United States or the ago. Or In the Middle Ea&t last summer. But
Soviet Union, lies the specter of the thermo- a great power has to be very prudent as It
nuclear cloud. ~t Is a mighty deterrent.
embarks upon the use of force.
Small nations like North Korea, with m!n!It !s a strange new world !n which we l!ve,
mal physical power, are thus able to act w!th but desp! te present chagrins 1t has stirring
impunity as they have hardly ever been able poss!bili t!es.
to act !n the history o! the modern world.
The r ole of the great nation Is Infinitely
ditllcult and dangerous. It !s basically in- {From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 29, 1968]
hibited.
THE MOMENTUM OF BELLIGERENCE
These are considerations to keep !n m!nd
F aced with a possible replay or the Korean
when !t Is decided to station surve!llance war wh!le bogged down !n VIetnam, the Adships l!ke the Pueblo of! host!le coaats. There ministration can hardly be faulted for orderisn't much you can do about it when they Ing a limited call-up or a!r reservists. Yet the
get Into trouble.
danger Is great that both sides could progresHIJACKING PERIL
sively harden their "responses" untll the
Certainly American public opinion, and second Korean war would become a certainty.
No one pretends to know whether North
possibly ol!lc!al Judgment as well, has not
caught up w!th the changed terms or power. Korea's capture or the Intelligence sh!p
Pueblo
signals an Intent to open a seoonc1
Possibly the Defense Department authorities
should have thought long and hard before front. Many doubt !t, seeing in the Incident
they placed craft like the Pueblo a few mUes Instead an attempt to exploit &n Inviting opoff North Korea, or deep In the Tonkin Gul!, portunity-the vulnerabU!ty of a lonely,
o r !n other such exposed places. The dangers l!ghtly armed ve86el jammed w!th sophisticated electronic gear.
of h!jack!ng are real and present.
Few of us know how valuable the use or
The harsh fact nonetheless remains that
spy ships really !s. Perhaps the operation !s the North Koreans are eminently capable of
or the essence. Perhaps It !s of peripheral Im- re-starting that war, wh!ch has been a most
portance. The risk !s certainly very great. It !s uneasy state of suspension these 15 years, tyto be hoped that the returns £tre comparable. Ing down 50,000 U.S. troops. It's not only
Presumably many of the Russian trawlers North Korea.; the Communists can open secwhich hover dll!gently of! Cape Cod, and ond fronts in Laos and Thn.lland &nd elseother parts of the United States coast, both where along the vast periphery of the Red
At.lantlc and Pacific. have an espionage mis- world.
sion n.long wt!h thc!r teke of fish . But rarely
A further !act !s that right now may seem
have they pressed the 12-m!le i!m!t or any- an attractive time !or the North Koreans
thing l!ke !t. Wh1•n they come closer In, they (or others) to do so. Along w! th all 1ts other
get permission. Hea l!stlcally, of course, one woes !n VIetnam, the U.S. !s confronted W!th
must assume that submarines are gathering what may be the biggest battle of the war
d ata anywhere thPre !s deep enough water. at Khe Sanh below the demJI!tarl.zed zone:
There, 5,000 Marines are tightly encircled by
DANGEROt ~S UNCERTAINTY
North VIetnamese and VIetcong forces, and
There !s a lot to be said for the value of the
American position !ti perilous.
aU this s pying. President Eisenhower's openTo some. Indeed , Khe Sanh looks l!ke anhklcs proposal at ( iPneva w·"' hased on t.he other
Dter:ble,:>~hu. To U6 !t appenrs rather

unlll<ely, tne u .b. strength In VIetnam oemg
so much greater than was the French In 1954.
At best, though Khe Sanh Is a bitter reminder
how much power the Communists can still
mount alter nil the punishment they have
taken from the U.S. And It could well Impress
the North Koreans as a good time for major
troublc-m.nklng precisely for that renson.
For still a further unplensant fact, the
US. Is In fairly poor shape to wngc a new
Korean war, let alone any others. As our
W::u;hlngton Bureau puts It, the call-up of
reservist.~ Ptnphnslzc.s that very point: for
nil Its enormous power, the VIetnam wnr has
spread the power thin and the nation Is short
of men nnd materiel for any sustained
struggle with North Korea. Which adds one
more chapter to the long lesson about the
dangers or p;ettlng mllltarlly overextended
and overcommitted around tho world.
Suppose, however, that the North Koreans
have no such Intentions, that the Pueblo's
capt=e wns an Isolated foray It Is still a
tread erous sttul\tlon, ~a use It is one In
which each side's successiVe steps could
carry things out of hand, North Korea could
react to the call-up by more mllltary moves;
the US. could then react with tougher steps
or too own. In no time the fat could be In
the tile
Caution thus Is mandatory So far we
think the Adralnlst.ratlon probably has been
reasonably rcstralmd Certainly It could not
just sit there. saying and doing nothing
wlll'e the North Koreans koct> the ship and
crew. Wa.•hlngt..on titercfor< Is trying to .exhaust dlplomatlc means taking the Issue
to the UN Se<:urlty Council, tor ex:unplebefore re£Ort to force Fortunately, this npproach &EetnS J..o hR\C the pprOHII O! ntOSl
members of Congr
There 1s finally, one speclllc reason why
the K orean confrontation &hould not be allowed to e6Cala te, \\1lly-n!lly, Into war. It
"'ould be wholly d proportion te J..o the
ostensible callS<', name:y the Pueblo and the
nature or Its mission.
Rt"mentl><'r he U 2" II the US Government Cf>nslders It necess ary, nnd It doubtless is In th~ world as It Is. to send a lone
recorllla.l.ssance plane high ovf.>r Russia, It
must. renl! ,.. the rtsk and be prep:l.l'ed to
lose the plane The U.S. never reg rded Its
shooting down by the Soviets aa a cause o!
war

Exactly the same wltll the Pueblo. ll.fany
question.< :.re unans wered n.bOut the h lmclllng of I
predicament. and the seizure
ltsPIC Is humiliating and ln!uriMing. Still,
If the US viPws that kind or ml ton 1\8
es.s•ntlal. It should be prepared to accept
what can h pt>en "1thout OH~r-n:actlng to
the poln t o r r1sk.ing actual war
Granted. If the North K 01 ns do a1m to
re op n the war, the6e ob6erva.tlons are
acadtmlc But for w,ll' to c(lllle without appropriate oe.use, merely through the momentwn of mutual belllgerence could be ""'
tragic as th ooasequences or the shot at
Sarajevo.
[From the Baltimore (Md .) Sun, Jan 28,
1968)
DECaU OJ' ClliSIS

For thoroughly good reMons, the AdminIstration In Washington Ia doing Its utmost
to find a pe.<ecful solution to the problem of
the vessel Pueblo and Its crew. One r<·as<m
Is that the alternative Is mlllUiry nc tl on of
unpre<llrtnble eventual dimensions, however
llmlted It might br "t !Irs , and with our
ma.slve commitment In Vletnnm we could
not easily underta ke another I .rge war In
Koren
In Korel\ we nrc militarily thin, wlt.h son'e
60.000 tl'lw>ps. unwng them two divisions not
<'tmslttf'rt"d nnnhAt-rf'ady Be!itdes thot , nhC>nt

47.000 South

K<>r~nn

troop•,

pr~•\tmllbly

th"

best, are tJed down alongside \18 In VIetnam.
Apart frorr. questions o! air and sea strengths
and of m~terlel, those figures on ground
troops give the picture. And the VIetnam
war Is &O vora.clo\18 In Its requlrements that
we could not supply swift reinforcement In
Korea.
Also grim to contemplate Is the effect Involvement In another large con.ftlct would
have domestically. The cancellations o! Internal urgencies, the econornlc disruptions,
the Impositions of controls, the mounting
taxes, come all too readily to the Imagination,
Then there Is the fact that, as the AdminIs tration l<nows, this Is not Inherently a
maJor crisis. It could grow Into one, but In
Its nature It Is not. It Is an incident; a
serious one. but an Incident.
One simple way o! judging Its Inherent
gravity Is to note the comparative degrees
of concern with which the public followed
the proceedings o! the Unl ted Nations before and during the Arab-Israel war last
June, and follows them now. At that time
the !acts and the Issues were stark and plain,
o.s were the dangers, Including the danger
of a direct Arnerlca.n-Russlnn confrontation.
Dangers of that magnitude exist today
only 1! permitted to develop from a state of
general confusion The North Koreans could
encourage a heigh tenlng or danger by refusing f\ntly to release the men or the
Pueblo. or by placing them on trial Others,
too b y lnt t·nt o r error, could contribute
'I he Administration shows a determination , while prep:u-lng for contingencies, to
m11ke every effort to obtain the releo.se of
the men without using military !orce-cvery
effort, that Is, n o t to let events take charge
and begin to swt>ep ahea.d wth n mom en tum
of ther own, beyond control.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
have listened with a great deal o! interest to the remarks of the distinguished
minority leader. I can understand his
great concern about the situation which
has developed Incident to the seizure of
the U.S.S. Pueblo and the Imprisonment
of its crew.
There Is no question in my mindnone whatsoever-that the ship was Illegally seized outside U1e 12-mile llmlt,
which Is the limit set by the North Korean Government Itself. But I think the
Pre !dent Is operating on the right wavelength , and In his capacity as the President of the United Stales and Commander In Chlef Is using every avallable
means at his diplomatic disposal to see If
It Is at all possible to bring about the
return of the 83 men, including the two
ctvllians, which comprl~>e the crew of the
U S .S. Pueblo.
What I am lntrrested ln. Mr. President, Is the return of those 83 men alive-alive-and I think that Is something we
ought to keep In mind at all times because It would do no good to go in and
sny, "sink the Pueblo," or "bomb a city,"
as has been suggested, and In that manner seal the doom of the 83 men who
were there, not by choice but under orders. We must see wltat we can do to
save them.
Mr. President. that I think, Is the
paramount fact.or In tills whole affair at
this time. I am quite cL•r!aln U1at the dlstlnr,Utslwd mil •rity lr.tder would agree
w1lh me In tln i resprcl

